Continuing conversations about abortion and deprivation
This essay examines Marquis’ argument about abortion on his own terms and responds to objections about whom death deprives, whether the action of killing or the result of death should focus on, and how harms suffered before existence compare to harms suffered after death.
Abstract
In ‘Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, I argued that Marquis’ argument about abortion encounters the Epicurean Challenge. In this essay, I continue the conversation begun there. I aim to motivate the Challenge further by examining Marquis’ argument on his own terms and responding to objections about whom death deprives, whether we should focus on the action of killing or the result of death, and how harms suffered before existence compare to harms suffered after death. Finally, I suggest that perhaps the solution to the ethics of killing lies in considering another account of harm entirely—one that does not rely on deprivation.