Two forward and backward private DSSE schemes with conjunctive queries based on the Oblivious Cross-Tags framework are introduced and two new levels of backward privacy are presented, which describe the leakages of conjunctive queries with OXT framework more accurately.
Recent developments in the field of Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE) with forward and backward privacy have attracted much attention from both research and industrial communities. However, most DSSE schemes with forward and backward privacy schemes only support single keyword queries, which impedes its prevalence in practice. Although some forward and backward private DSSE schemes with expressive queries (e.g., conjunctive queries) have been introduced, their backward privacy either essentially corresponds to single keyword queries or forward privacy is not comprehensive. In addition, the deletion of many DSSE schemes is achieved by addition paired with a deletion mark (i.e., lazy deletion). To address these problems, we present two novel DSSE schemes with conjunctive queries (termed SDSSE-CQ and SDSSE-CQ-S), which achieve both forward and backward privacy. To analyze their security, we present two new levels of backward privacy (named Type-O and Type-O-, more and more secure), which give a more comprehensive understanding of the leakages of conjunctive queries in the OXT framework. Eventually, the security analysis and experimental evaluations show that the proposed schemes achieve better security with reasonable computation and communication increase.