The Influence of the Uncertainty on Drones’ Cognition in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Communication Network
A model that the leader drone is aware of the observed differences but all follower drones do not realize is proposed, and the concrete definition of Hyper Best Response Equilibrium (HBRE) is given.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the one-leader-multi-followers unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) security game with misperception. In the leader-follower UAV security game, the solution concept under misperceptions can be defined as Misperception Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (MSSE). However, by observing other strategies, players may realize the misperception, which makes players not trust their current cognition any longer. Therefore, this paper proposes a model that the leader drone is aware of the observed differences but all follower drones do not realize, and give the concrete definition of Hyper Best Response Equilibrium (HBRE). Besides, this paper analyzes the relation between the two equilibria in the one-leader-multi-followers UAV security game with misperception to reveal a sufficient condition for cognitive stability and strategy stability. Moreover, this paper verifies our conclusion by constructing several experiments.