Human value
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Abstract
The question to be addressed in this brief talk is the following: from a moral point of view, what makes human beings special? How do they acquire a special value? The question presupposes that human beings do possess a special value. Is this presupposition warranted? In a way, yes. In another way, no. When it comes to the question of life and death, human beings are special. But when it comes to questions of pleasure and pain, human beings are not special. When it comes to questions of pleasure and pain, human beings, and other animals, are on a moral par. Let me develop the latter theme first. It has often been taken for granted that, from a moral point of view, human beings are special. Their interests deserve to be taken more seriously than the interests of other animals. In order to provide a human being with a slight advantage, it is morally acceptable to cause an animal considerable suffering. But this is a moral mistake. To the extent that other animals have interests, their interests deserve to be taken as seriously as the corresponding interest of human beings. And it is an obvious fact that many higher animals do have interests. All animals capable of feeling pleasure and pain have interests. It is in their interest not to suffer, and it is in their interest to experience pleasure. Other animals are not different from human beings in this respect. How do we know this? Well, it follows from a very plausible moral outlook according to which, impartially, we ought to promote well-being. To make differences between, say, individuals of different sex (or gender), or of different human races,