The Finale of AI: Artificial Intelligence
This work defends AI against the sentimentality charge, under each of the ways in which the notion has been be construed, and explains the film’s apparent lack of consistency as emerging from one of the clear goals this movie has: blurring distinctions that are fundamental to the authors' conception of the world.
Abstract
AI: Artificial Intelligence might be Steven Spielberg’s most underrated film. Most criticism converge on the film’s alleged sentimentality—a trait attributed to Spielberg and considered a departure from Stanley Kubrick’s original vision for it—and targets the 23-minute film coda as the repository of such sentimentality and as adding incoherence to the story. I defend AI against the sentimentality charge, under each of the ways in which the notion has been be construed, and explain the film’s apparent lack of consistency as emerging from one of the clear goals this movie has: blurring distinctions that are fundamental to our conception of the world. I conduct my analysis in light of a notion that have in past work dubbed ‘distinctness’—of whether a movie’s cognitive import can be considered distinct, that is, as embodied not just in a movie’s story by in the artistic narrative the movie is. My defense of AI and its finale will appeal to a few factors: (1) the range of intertwining themes the movie develops (human mortality, grief, lowliness, appearance v. reality, etc.), as those emerge through a variety of cinematic means; (2) the movie’s coda as allowing clarification on the structure of the narration and on the film’s genre categorization; (3) a close investigation of the modes of engagement AI promotes. AI is undoubtedly moving, yet that is insufficient to deeming it sentimental. However, a successful defense of the film cannot be accomplished by appeal to the film’s alleged philosophical, or more broadly cognitive, accomplishments. AI ought fails to be sentimental or flawed by inconsistencies precisely for what may suggest such objections. The film moves us in complex and dual ways—inherently pervaded by ambiguities. The result is a film that, amongst other things, leaves us wondering about and grieving for the human condition. I am an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Lafayette College, in Easton, Pennsylvania (USA). My areas of specialty are aesthetics and the philosophy of art, with special interest in cinema and more generally narrative arts. In my work, I have investigated the nature of our engagement with narratives and their characters—including such notions as empathy, sympathy, and what I have dubbed ‘experiential identification’—and some of the relations between artistic and ethical value. Two representative publications are: “Ethical Criticism in Perspective: A Defense of Radical Moralism” (2013); “Cognitive Value and Imaginative Identification: The Case of Kubrick’s Eyes Wide Shut ” (2010).