Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science (review)
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Abstract
also who we might become—a better or a lesser being, whose traits we acquire and indeed define in the choices we make’’ [p. xxx]), which has rightly been termed teleological, his own ontology of nature appears to be strictly descriptive and causal, in conformity with modern scientific conceptions. It is thus an ‘‘anthropomorphic’’ confusion to apply our moral notions to the natural realm (p. 123). But the biblical account of creation is itself by fiat, as Hans Kelsen (Society and Nature [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943]; The Pure Theory of Law [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967], pp. 18–22) pointed out in describing the ‘‘primitive’’ historical roots of the is/ought confusion. And Goodman himself describes law and nature as ‘‘God’s two utterances’’ (p. 141). Jewish law itself adopted a ‘‘teleological’’ conception of the dherekh of animals, though Maimonides reformulated it in purely descriptive terms (Jackson, in Jewish Law Annual 1 [1978]: 168–176). Goodman recognizes the survival of such notions in the context of natural disasters when he writes: ‘‘We take that fact [that nature stands aside for no one] for granted in our practical affairs yet often feel offended by it when we shift to an evaluative mode’’ (p. 122). It will be interesting to compare Goodman’s critical accounts with more systematic internal reconstructions of different Jewish traditions. For example, how may we understand the apparent movement from a ‘‘monistic’’ to a ‘‘dualistic’’ conception of the relationship between human law and divine justice (Jackson, in Daimon 4 [2004]: 31–48), and the relationship of imitatio between them? It is hoped that Goodman’s work will find its ‘‘ecumenical community’’ within the Jewish world as well as outside it.