Neurosocialities: Anthropological Engagements with the Neurosciences
This editorial critically engage with Vidal’s influential proclamation of the era of brainhood, in light of an emerging body of work – undertaken in and across anthropology, science and technology studies, feminist studies, and sociology – on the relationship between neuroscience, the self, and society.
Abstract
Over the last three decades, the neurosciences have emerged as a prestigious and influential force in industrial society research. In an ascendance that in many ways parallels that of genomics, the neurosciences have been championed as a valuable source of information into “that which makes us human,” and as a potential source of much-needed therapeutic interventions for a range of disorders, and new technologies for enhancing cognitive, emotional and social skills. Vast financial and symbolic resources have been invested in both “small” and “big science” projects, including the US’s vast BRAIN Initiative and the EU’s Human Brain Project. In popular culture, public fascination with the “neuro” is illustrated by a profusion of accessible popular writings on the brain, the prevalence of MRI and PET brain images in media, and the emergence of gurus in diverse fields such as “neurobusiness,” who claim, for example, to use neuroscience to enhance business acumen (e.g. NBI 2016). Almost ten years ago, Fernando Vidal (2009) argued that these are features of the “cerebral subject” – the “anthropological figure inherent in modernity.” The cerebral subject, Vidal argued, is characterized by brainhood: “the property or quality of being, rather than simply having, a brain” (2009:22). For Vidal, brainhood is the contemporary manifestation of a coherent evolution in western philosophical thought: Descartes equated the soul with the mind, Locke equated personal identity with self-awareness, and other thinkers subsequently located the mind firmly in the brain. Brainhood, accordingly, was a precondition for, rather than a product of, neuroscientific developments. In this editorial, we critically engage with Vidal’s influential proclamation of the era of brainhood, in light of an emerging body of work – undertaken in and across anthropology, science and technology studies (STS), feminist studies, and sociology – on the relationship between neuroscience, the self, and society. Much of this work is informed by detailed explorations of neuroscience, neurotechnologies, and neurological illnesses in their ordinary milieu. This work, we argue, highlights the performative power of the “neuro” in contemporary societies, but it also exposes tensions and ambiguities integral to contemporary neuroscience developments that are elided if we continue to posit some sort of relentless march towards neurocentrism. Given the findings of this body of work, we tentatively provide a sketch of how anthropology might best continue to engage with the neurosciences. Neuro discourse, Vidal argues, reifies possessive individualism. Identity is attributed to coherent, brain-situated cognition, while the complexity and fluidity of identity-forming practices, and the social bonds that constitute these practices, are in effect ignored. A considerable body of studies on neuroscience and neurotechnologies “in the field” demonstrates the allure of brain-based explanations of personhood and behavior, and an alignment with the sentiments of possessive individualism (e.g. Rapp 2012; Fein 2012). Perhaps the best known of these relate to the forms of sociality that characterize the “neurodiversity” movement, in which neurobiological accounts of autism are creatively appropriated as a positive identity by those with an autism diagnosis (Ortega 2009).