Technological and strategic aspects of ballistic missile defence
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Abstract
Although almost seven years have passed since the Reagan Administration announced its plan to construct a shield against enemy missiles, the ultimate outcome of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) is still uncertain. Nevertheless, this persistent uncertainty does not represent, in and of itself, a definitive failure of the plan. Indeed, the Reagan Administration officials as well as the former president himself have always emphasized that the SDI program would require 'years, probably decades, of efforts on many fronts' and would not be free from failures and setbacks. Indeed, the unshakable faith in the ultimate success of the SDI program has not made even its most ardent advocates blind to the difficulties of implementing it. However, Ronald Reagan's promise to ensure an efficient defensive system against the threat of nuclear destruction has proved to be a demanding legacy for the new Administration which took office in January 1988. Given the long-term approach to SDI and the delays already encountered, the Bush Administration will probably not have the last word on it. Even so, the decisions that will be made about SDI in the near future will undoubtedly have a significant effect on its fate. The program has already been slowed down considerably. From the very beginning, Congress has consistently cut the Administration's budget requests for it. The reluctance of Congress to support the program to the extent considered necessary by its proponents, as well as the increasingly worrying US budget difficulties, forced the previous Administration to work out a substantial revision of the program in 1988. The design of the defensive system to be deployed in the first phase—particularly that of space-based antimissile rockets, the most expensive element — was simplified, providing instead for increased numbers