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Indian Philosophy and the Consequences of Knowledge

9 Citations2009
Mark Siderits
Ars Disputandi

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Abstract

This work consists of five chapters each of which explores a particular facet of a larger theme, that of the place of knowledge in Indian theories of liberation. Classical Indian philosophy is distinctive for the widespread (though not universal) acceptance one finds there of the notion that the highest end – liberation from the wheel of rebirth and the suffering that attends such sam. sāric existence – is attained through cognition of some sort. We even find the claim in the Bhagavad Gı̄tā that devotion to God leads to liberation by producing the requisite liberating knowledge in the devotee. An investigation of the soteriological significance of knowledge in Indian philosophy may prove worthwhile for those seeking a way out of the impasse generated by the faith-reason dichotomy in modern Western thought. The first chapter concerns the epistemology and semantics that stem from what Ram-Prasad calls Jainism’s ‘multiplist metaphysics’, the view that reality is such as to warrant true contradictions. It is widely held that this position represents an expression of the Jain commitment to non-violence (the practice of which is central to attaining liberation on their view). The idea is that refuting the position of one’s opponent is itself an unjustifiable form of violence, since it rests on the false assumption that two contradictory views cannot both be true. The difficulty lies in articulating this in a way that avoids the trap of relativism about truth. Ram-Prasad has interesting things to say about how Jain efforts to accomplish this lead to the higher-order difficulty of avoiding relativism about the nature of the truth-predicate: what can Jaina philosophers say when their opponent insists that contradictions cannot be true? Ram-Prasad concedes that the resolution he has in mind goes beyond anything that Jainas say or even might want to say. It is nonetheless a suggestive and significant response to Jain thought. The second chapter explores the variety of views Indian philosophers held on the question how we come to be aware of our own cognitions. Some held that when we cognize a blue patch, we are aware only of the blue and not of the cognition whereby we come to be aware of the blue; awareness of the fact of cognizing comes only subsequent to the cognition. Others held that cognitions are self-luminous–a cognition illuminates not just its object but itself as well. RamPrasad discusses five distinct views on this matter. He then explores some ways