Citizens' Rights and Human Rights
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Abstract
Given the burgeoning literature on the devaluation of national citizenship and the effects of globalization, the sources and beneficiaries of individual legal rights assume increased importance. This Article seeks to distinguish those legal rights that states should confine to their own citizens from those that flow from residence, immigration status, territorial presence, or simply personhood. Section I examines the very reasons for states to distribute citizenship in the first place. These reasons relate to participatory democracy, immigration privileges, other rights and disabilities, personal emotional fulfillment, building community, continuity over time, sovereignty, and the world order. It finds unconvincing those reasons that rest on the municipal interests of states but, given the present world order, finds those reasons that are rooted in international relations more compelling. Building on those conclusions, Section II considers a second normative question: What are the key variables that should determine whether a given legal right should be confined to citizens rather than made more generally available to all persons or at least selected classes of noncitizens? Section III then illustrates how one country—the United States—parcels out legal rights and examines whether its decisions comport with the demands of international human rights law.