Philosophical Analysis and Philosophy of Religion
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Abstract
IN RECENT years an increasing number of able philosophers have said that the function of philosophy is logical analysis of language. Three questions arise: What do they mean by this, and why do they look at philosophy in this way? How shall we assess this program for philosophy? What do philosophers of religion need to do about it? Before dealing with these questions I ought to say that my remarks will be low in historical value. An adequate historical survey of this movement in philosophy would take account of its origins at Cambridge University early in this century, with appropriate, though perhaps sweeping, allusions to the origins of modern science, British empiricism, the Kantian revolution, and the development of modern logic since Frege. It would interpret what happened when Ludwig Wittgenstein came to Cambridge in 1912 to win Russell's respect and to puzzle and fascinate Moore. It would try to make sense, in terms of influences and interconnections, of the streams of philosophical discussion that have flowed from these sources. It would characterize the thought of John Wisdom, Gilbert Ryle, John Austin, and others and contrast contemporary British philosophy with the positivism of Mach and the Vienna Circle. It would draw attention to the influence that the British movement has already had on philosophy of religion, as shown, for example, in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by Flew and MacIntyre, and Faith and Logic, edited by Basil Mitchell. I cannot undertake such a survey.' All I can do is explain and discuss certain theses that I derive from a limited amount of reading and discussion and reflect on their significance for the philosophy of religion.