N narcissism as a descriptive term has been both abused and overused, and a more specific redefinition is long overdue, which is surprising that the metapsychology of such an important concept has not been more adequately described.
N THE V O I . U ~ ~ K O U S literature on narcissism, there are probably only two facts upon which everyone agrees: first, that the concept of narcissism is one of the most important contributions of psychoanalysis; second, that it is one of the most confusing. The difficulties with the concept were apparent from the beginning. Freud himself was dissatisfied with his original formulations. He wrote to Abraham: “The narcissism was a difficult labor and bears all the marks of a corresponding deformation.” “That you accept what I wrote about narcissism touches me deeply and binds us even closer together. I have a very strong feeling of vexation at its inadequacy” (Jones, 1955, p. 304). fitre do not know just why Freud was dissatisfied, but most current theoreticians feel that our present difficulties are “due mainly to the fact that this concept has not been explicitly redefined in terms of Freud’s later structural psychology” (Hartmann, 1950, p. 83). As Kernberg (1968) concisely puts it, narcissism as a descriptive term has been both abused and overused, and a more specific redefinition is long overdue. At first glance it is surprising that the metapsychology of such an important concept has not been more adequately described. The reason for this, however, becomes apparent on closer inspection: Freud’s original theoretical conception of narcissism