Why study Indian philosophy?
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Abstract
In this essay I am primarily concerned with those who are not of the Indian tradition, academicians for the most part, for whom the question ’Why?’ of the title ’Why Study Indian Philosophy?’ is, or in some cases should be, problematic. Philip Ashby has said: ’We know today that every religion must, not ought to, be understood on the basis of its own fundamental and absolute presuppositions or it is not understood.’ 1 This statement judges as invalid not only much of the work previously done on things Indian but also much of the work being done today. The argument that follows involves consideration of one of the ’fundamental and absolute presuppositions’ of Indian philosophy and, from that, consideration of how one who does not share that presupposition might relate to Indian thought in an understanding way. My argument is presented in three parts. Part one establishes a typology for the consideration of the nature of Indian philosophy, to make the point that the very nature of Indian philosophy is rigidly exclusivist according to the self-definition of the orthodox Hindu tradition. The examination of this exclusivism as a fundamental presupposition of Indian philosophy leads to the consideration of several Western cultural presuppositions, the awareness of which ought to condition one’s inquiry into Indian philosophy. In the second part I argue that, because of the modern doctrine of historicism and the radical distinction between facts and values, it is difficult for one of the modern West not to offend a tradition which may not stand on similar ground. In the third part I consider the possibility of studying a tradition which is not one’s own, in a way that makes the tradition relevant without doing injustice to its presuppositions. The third part is a programmatic discussion in relation to an important issue in Western thought which for purposes here has been summarized. The model of the problematic of the third part is simple. In the modem West there is great concern at present with the dehumanizing effects of technology in both the public and private sectors. Some hold that technology arose in the West with the failure of belief in teleology and the correspondent rise of natural science, and they argue that there is a relationship between the fact/value distinction and the alleged dehumanization caused by modern technology.2 It can, however, be shown that the fact/value distinction is