Ultimatum bargaining behavior: a survey and comparison of experimental results

Abstract

In an ulttmatum bargaming game players 1 and 2 can drstribute a positive amount of money m the following way: first, player 1 determines his demand which player 2 can then etther accept or induce confhct, i.e. player 2 faces the ultimatum either to accept player l’s proposal or to have no agreement at all. Experimentally observed ultimatum bargaimng decisrons with amounts ranging from 0.50 to 100 German marks are statistically analysed. The demands of player 1 are compared with the acceptance behavior of player 2 with the help of consistency tests in which a subject has to decide in the positron of both players. Finally, we constder ulttmatum bargaining games with more than just one round where, except for the final round, nonacceptance does not cause conflict but another round of ultrmatum bargainmg for a smaller cake.