Rationality and Authority: On the Confusion of Justification and Permission

Abstract

During the past several years I have elected to offer several comments on various psychological dimensions in science. These have ranged from technical pieces to intentionally value-laden openings. It is my enduring belief that contemporary science is seriously tethered by its own rigidity and more centrally by its reluctance to examine some of its inescapably insecure human foundations. The intensity and prevalence of emotionality in science needs little additional documentation, and I am not as convinced as some of my colleagues that this emotionality is a uniformly constructive element. When I read a contemporary debate or critique in science I am often struck by the contrast of its tenor to that apparent in the dialogues of Plato or Hume. While hardly immune to ad hominem overtones, these thinkers seem to have been much less preoccupied with demonstrating the mental incompetence of their conversants than some contemporary writers. It is, of course, difficult to separate message from source and as a psychologist 1 should perhaps be more understanding of such conflations. Thus, despite my genuine respect for the role of dialectical exchange in the growth of science, I find myself reluctant to respond to or otherwise participate in a dialogue in which I am portrayed as a butcher who has been 'hacking' away at scientific complexities 'with neo-Popperian meat-cleavers. But having said that I would not respond to this, I have obviously done so and have thereby consumed more space than I care to devote to surplus meanings and personal innuendos. It is my impression that Professor Hardin has elected to focus his technical remarks on the relationship of rationality and disconfirmation. Many of his arguments are directed at specific points distilled from a variety of scattered quotes. I shall respond to each of these briefly before offering a more holistic response to his more basic concerns. First, I am indeed guilty of overstatement and technical inaccuracy in my assertion that 'mnodus ponens and moduis ftolens are the only valid forms of inference.'2 This statement came out of an implicit context of convention (namely, the reign of Aristotelian thought in western philosophy and the unchallenged popularity of these two forms of inference). Within that context, I believe the statement remains accurate. If we shift to the abductive inference of the Stoics or the non-polar logic of some eastern perspectives, the number of inference forms considered valid by their generative systems becomes considerably larger. Hardin's second point on the truth-functional connective seems to be a reiteration of the difference between inferential necessity and sufficiency in material implication. I am more than willing to recognize this difference, but I question this invocation that we mix formal and informal meanings of the terms 'valid' and