Aristotle, Galileo, and the DSM taxonomy: The case of schizophrenia.

The fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders's approach to psychopathologic taxonomy is subjected to critical analysis as representing a fundamentally Aristotelian conception of the phenomena of mental disorders.

Abstract

With the diagnosis schizophrenia used as an example throughout, the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders's (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) approach to psychopathologic taxonomy is subjected to critical analysis as representing a fundamentally Aristotelian conception of the phenomena of mental disorders. This approach is contrasted, in the manner suggested by Kurt Lewin's early writing on the subject, with the Galileian mode of thought, emphasizing the dynamic causal matrix in which behavior occurs. Some of the positive implications of an altered view of the problem of taxonomy within the latter perspective are drawn out, and brief suggestions are made as to directions for the future.