Explanatory models of interactive choice behavior

Abstract

Most so-called and in the behavioral sciences tend to be formulated in qualitative terms which are often ill-defined. Hence, consequences can seldom be rigorously deduced from them, and those consequences that are extracted can seldom be conclusively tested. This has made it possible for conflicting explanations of the same type of behavior to live side by side for many years; for example, Gestalt and Associationalist theories of perception; Freudian, Adlerian, Jungian, and many other varieties of psychoanalytic theories; and a large number of learning theories. Because most psychological theories are not testable in any conclusive way they seem never to die, and only seldom even to fade away. A more important consequence is that theory development is not nearly as cumulative in the behavioral sciences as it is in other sciences; convergence and generalization of behavioral theories are relatively rare phenomena. This paper reports the results of using a specifically designed research methodology to obtain and generalize a quantitative explanation of human behavior in multi-person, interactive games. The games are interactive in the sense that the payoff to one individual resulting from the selection of a particular strategy depends on the strategy selections of the other participants. The payoffs are monetary and the games are structured so that the monetary preferences of outcomes for each individual create a conflict of interest among the participants. The only permitted form of interaction between the participants, and thus the only way the conflict can be resolved, is through the selection of strategies during the course of the game. The objective of the research program reported herein was to identify, quantify, and relate the properties of the conflict environment, the history of the conflict, and the characteristics of the individual which explain his actions at a particular time in the game.