Effects of interpersonal trust and time pressure on managerial mediation strategy in a simulated organizational dispute.

Abstract

Participants in a laboratory experiment (N = 79) role-played managers mediating a dispute between 2 peers. Building on previous research ( e.g., P.J. Carnevale & D. E. Conlon, 1988) and theory (e.g., D. G. Pruitt, 1981), a 2 X 3 factorial design varied time pressure on the mediators (high vs. low time pressure) and trust exhibited between 2 preprogrammed disputants ( high trust vs. low trust vs. a no-message control group). Participants could choose from messages exhibiting P. J. Carnevale's (1986) Strategic Choice Model of Conflict Mediation (inaction, pressing, compensating, or integrating), as well as rapport-building messages from K. Kressel's (1972) reflexive strategy. Results suggested that high time pressure increased the mediators' use of pressing messages and decreased the use of inaction messages. Participants also sent more reflexive messages when trust was low. Results are discussed in terms of mediation and conflict management theory.