Congressional supervision of monetary policy
Journal of Monetary EconomicsPublished 1 April 1978
Robert E. Weintraub
Citations107
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score7.87
SNIP2.70
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Abstract
We estimate monetary policy reaction functions which describe how individual FOMC members' monetary policy preferences vary according to their professional and career backgrounds, their appointment status (as a Governor or Bank President), and their partisan or district Reserve Bank affiliations. Based on our results, we present examples illustrating how proposed changes in the composition of the FOMC might be evaluated.
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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