Don't lose your reputation
NaturePublished 1 November 2004
Ernst Fehr
Citations205
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score18.29
SNIP10.16
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TL;DR
Collective action in large groups whose members are genetically unrelated is a distinguishing feature of the human species.
Abstract
Collective action in large groups whose members are genetically unrelated is a distinguishing feature of the human species. Individual reputations may be a key to a satisfactory evolutionary explanation.
Keywords
PsychologySocial SciencesPhysics and Astronomy
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