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The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game

International Journal of Game TheoryPublished 1 June 1976
S. C. Littlechild, K. G. Vaidya
Citations61
SJR quartileQ2
SJR score0.34
SNIP0.69

TL;DR

The “disruption nucleolus” of ann-person game is proposed, a generalisation of the concept of an individual player's "propensity to disrupt" a payoff vector in a three-person characteristic function game.

Abstract

Gately [1974] recently introduced the concept of an individual player's "propensity to disrupt" a payoff vector in a three-person characteristic function game. As a generalisation of this concept we propose the "disruption nucleolus" of ann-person game. The properties and computational possibilities of this concept are analogous to those of the nucleolus itself. Two numerical examples are given.

Keywords

Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance