Introducing Influence Processes into a System of Collective Decisions

Abstract

This paper modifies and extends the model of collective decisionmaking processes proposed by Coleman in The Mathematics of Collective Action by introducing a process in which the interests expressed by actors may be influenced by those of other actors. After incorporation of this individual-level process within the framework of Coleman's model, its effects at the system level are explored by comparing results generated by the modified model with those produced by the original model. Analyses of artificial data indicate that the nature and magnitude of system-level effects are contingent on (1) the pattern of interest differentiation in the influence network; and (2) the degree of centralization of the influence network. Depending on these features, the effects of the influence process on collective decision making may be (1) a decline in the system level of resource mobilization; (2) an increase in the level of apparent consensus on collective decisions; and/or (3) a bias in collective decisions toward the interests of the actors centrally located in the influence network.