Reciprocal Justice and Strategies of Exchange

Abstract

Using a conception of reciprocal rather than distributive justice, we investigate the fairness of power strategies in exchange networks. We propose that norms of fairness affect the risk of using different strategies, by influencing the probability that they will provoke retaliation or resistance. Using computer-simulated actors to manipulate strategies, we investigate how subjects perceive and respond to their partners ' strategies that vary in reciprocity and power base. /is predicted, subjects in power-balanced networks judged both reward- and punishment-based power strategies as more unfair than reciprocal strategies, and punishment strategies as more unfair than equally nonreciprocal reward strategies. Punishment strategies provoked more resistance than reward strategies but, unexpectedly, no greater retaliation. Over time, the instrumental effects of the strategies tended to overcome reactions to injustice. Despite their common roots in social exchange theory, the social psychological literatures on power and justice have developed quite independently. As several authors have noted (Cohen & Greenberg 1982; Cook & Hegtvedt 1986; Homans 1976), surprisingly little theoretical or empirical work has addressed the relation between the two. The few studies that have examined the theoretical or empirical linkages between power and justice suggest they have reciprocal effects on each other. Structures of power can affect the formation of justice norms (Austin & Hatfield 1980; Della Fave 1980; Stolte 1987a), but norms of justice in turn constrain the use of power (Cook & Emerson 1978; Cook, Hegtvedt & Yamagishi 1988). The unjust use of power can provoke retaliation and resistance (Lawler 1975), but the structure of power makes such responses