Coyness, philandering and stable strategies

Animal BehaviourPublished 1 February 1981

Peter Schuster, Karl Sigmund

DOI10.1016/s0003-3472(81)80165-0

Source URL

Citations132

SJR quartileQ1

SJR score0.81

SNIP0.91

TL;DR

This paper shows how to use a class of ordinary differential equations to investigate situ- ations leading to oscillations of genetically influ- enced social behaviour and shows that the equilibrium of the strategies is not evolutionarily stable, but equal to the time average of the endlessly oscillating strategies.

Abstract

An example put forward by Dawkins to describe the evolution of strategies in the conflict of the sexes over parental investment is discussed by means of a simple dynamic system. It is shown that the equilibrium of the strategies is not evolutionarily stable, but equal to the time average of the endlessly oscillating strategies.

Keywords

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