Independence of Episodic and Semantic Self-Knowledge: The Case from Autism

Abstract

Knowledge of one's traits and personal recollections of specific events involving those traits are assumed to reflect the operations of two distinct, neurally dissociable types of memory: Semantic personal memory and episodic personal memory (e.g., Conway, 1992; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996; Tulving, 1993b). The present study offers support for this conclusion by examining the semantic and episodic self-knowledge of R.J., a high-functioning autistic individual. R.J. was found to have accurate knowledge of his traits, despite severely limited access to the personal experiences on which that knowledge was based. We discuss the implications of this finding for theories of both normal and autistic memory, and we speculate about the ability of persons with autism to reflect on aspects of the self.