Contingency management under asymmetric information
Operations Research LettersPublished 21 February 2005Open access
Ananth V. Iyer, Vinayak Deshpande, Zhengping Wu
Citations30
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TL;DR
A monopolist supplier whose supply to multiple buyers is disrupted can take costly, speed-dependent actions, to restore supply and analyze the supplier's optimal contract structure and explore the impact of an alternate supplier.
Abstract
We model a monopolist supplier whose supply to multiple buyers is disrupted. The supplier can take costly, speed-dependent actions, to restore supply. Buyers experience private backorder costs that are unknown to the supplier. We analyze the supplier's optimal contract structure and explore the impact of an alternate supplier.
Keywords
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