An approach for extending dynamic models to settings with multi-product firms
Economics LettersPublished 5 December 2007
Aviv Nevo, Federico Rossi
Citations33
SJR quartileQ2
SJR score0.76
SNIP0.98
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TL;DR
An approach to extend the standard framework of dynamic games to settings with multi-product firms and apply to industries with a large number of products offered by a small number of firms is proposed.
Abstract
We propose an approach to extend the standard framework of dynamic games to settings with multi-product firms. Our approach applies to industries with a large number of products offered by a small number of firms.
Keywords
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