Event representation in Pavlovian conditioning: Image and action

This article describes experiments with rats that suggest that under some circumstances, the CS acquires control of perceptual processing of the US, in the absence of that US itself, and presents three kinds of evidence for this surrogate processing, which is likened to imagery or hallucination.

Abstract

In a typical Pavlovian conditioning experiment, a relatively insignificant event, the conditioned stimulus (CS), is paired with a biologically more meaningful event, the unconditioned stimulus (US). As a consequence of those pairings, the CS is thought to acquire response characteristics of the US. In this article I describe experiments with rats that suggest that under some circumstances, the CS acquires control of perceptual processing of the US, in the absence of that US itself. I present three kinds of evidence for this surrogate processing, which I liken to imagery or hallucination: (1) CSs come to control specific, sensory-evaluative responses normally evoked only by the USs; (2) CSs can substitute for USs in the establishment of new learning about those USs themselves; (3) CSs can substitute for USs in the modulation of conditioning to other events, either overshadowing (interfering) or potentiating learning, in the same manner as the USs themselves. Finally, I compare these data with evidence for conditioned sensation and imagery in humans, and suggest that imagery may be a very basic process, evolutionarily derived from perceptual and conditioning processes adapted to deal with remote or absent objects.