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Decision making with unreliable probabilities

British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical PsychologyPublished 1 November 1983
Peter Gärdenfors, Nils‐Eric Sahlin
Citations106
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score1.16
SNIP1.39

TL;DR

A decision theory is presented which allows subjects to account for the uncertainties of their probability estimates by modelling beliefs about states of nature by means of a class of probability measures and a measure of epistemic reliability is introduced.

Abstract

This paper presents a decision theory which allows subjects to account for the uncertainties of their probability estimates. This is accomplished by modelling beliefs about states of nature by means of a class of probability measures. In order to represent uncertainties of those beliefs a measure of epistemic reliability is introduced. The suggested decision theory is evaluated in the light of empirical evidence on ambiguity and uncertainty in decision making. The theory is also compared to Tversky & Kahneman's prospect theory.

Keywords

Decision SciencesArts and Humanities