Determinants of Taiwan's Trade Liberalization: The Case of a Newly Industrialized Country

Abstract

Abstract This paper attempts to account for the success of policy reform in Taiwan's trade liberalization through an investigation of the periods 1986–92, and 1992–95. The objective is to undertake an empirical examination of Haggard et al.'s (The political feasibility of adjustment in developing countries. Development Centre of the OECD, OECD, Paris, 1995) strategies for minimizing the political costs involved in implementing policy reforms. Empirical evidence supports the Haggard et al. arguments, that is, indirect compensation is used to facilitate the implementation of trade liberalization for downstream industries, while the speed of trade liberalization within certain specific industries is comparatively slow. Furthermore, in a democratic regime, the pressure brought to bear by well-organized domestic interest groups, along with the pressure from international interest groups, can strongly influence the pattern of trade liberalization policies.