Dynamic lot-sizing in sequential online retail auctions

This work presents a complete structural characterization of optimal lot-sizing policies under a second order condition on the single-auction expected revenue function and shows that a monotone staircase with unit jumps policy is optimal and a simple inequality to determine the locations of these staircase jumps.

Abstract

Retailers often conduct non-overlapping sequential online auctions as a revenue generation and inventory clearing tool. We build a stochastic dynamic programming model for the seller’s lot-size decision problem in these auctions. The model incorporates a random number of participating bidders in each auction, allows for any bid distribution, and is not restricted to any specific price-determination mechanism. Using stochastic monotonicity/stochastic concavity and supermodularity arguments, we present a complete structural characterization of optimal lot-sizing policies under a second order condition on the single-auction expected revenue function. We show that a monotone staircase with unit jumps policy is optimal and provide a simple inequality to determine the locations of these staircase jumps. Our analytical examples demonstrate that the second order condition is met in common online auction mechanisms. We also present numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses using real online auction data.