How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions
European Economic ReviewPublished 1 May 2002
Paul Klemperer
Citations368
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score2.40
SNIP1.67
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Abstract
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS") mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licenses sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark.
Keywords
Decision SciencesBusiness, Management and Accounting
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