Information and economic analysis
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Abstract
Preface to the Selected Works Introduction to Volume I I. PERSPECTIVES ON INFORMATION ANALYSIS 1. Information and Economic Analysis 2. Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics IIA. THE GENERAL THEORY OF SCREENING 3. The Theory of Screening, Education and the Distribution of Income 4. A Model of Employment Outcome Illustrating the Effect of the Structure of Information on the Level and Distribution of Income IIB. THEORY OF SELF-SELECTION Introduction to Section IIB 5. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information 6. Competition and Insurance Twenty Years Later 7. Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing, and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market 8. Prices and Queues as Screening Devices in Competitive Markets 9. Sorting Out the Differences Between Screening and Signaling Models IIC. THEORY OF ADVERSE SELECTION, EFFICIENCY WAGES, AND CREDIT RATIONING Introduction to Section IIC 10. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information 11. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device 12. The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality Prices III THEORY OF INCENTIVES AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 13. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping 14. Information, Competition, and Markets 15. Human Fallibility and Economic Organization 16. The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard 17. Credit Markets and the Control of Capital 18. Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets IV. INFORMATION AND PRICES Introduction to Section IV 19. Information and Competitive Price Systems 20. Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion 21. On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets 22. A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information V. WELFARE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION Introduction to Section V 23. Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets 24. Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring VI. INFORMATION AND MACRO-ECONOMICS Introduction to Section VI 25. Informational Imperfections in the Capital Markets and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 26. Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles
