Cooperation in Primates and Humans
Published 1 January 2006
Peter M. Kappeler
Citations235
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Abstract
Cooperative behavior has been one of the enigmas of evolutionary theory since the days of Charles Darwin. The contributions to this book examine the many facets of cooperative behavior in primates and
Keywords
PsychologySocial Sciences
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