On 64%-Majority Rule
EconometricaPublished 1 July 1988
Andrew Caplin, Barry Nalebuff
Citations222
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score21.09
SNIP5.31
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Abstract
Introduction d'une definition de consensus social base sur deux restrictions: une sur les preferences individuelles et l'autre sur la distribution des preferences. Dans ce cas de consensus, une regle de majorite a 64% presente de nombreuses proprietes interessantes par opposition aux regles de super-majorite possedant des proprietes paradoxales comme les regles electorales americaines
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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