Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees
American Economic ReviewPublished 1 March 1996Open access
Randall S. Kroszner, Thomas Stratmann
Citations375
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Abstract
This paper develops a positive theory of how competition among political pressure groups shapes the organization of Congress and empirically investigates how such competition in financial services affects the distribution of political action committee (PAC) contributions to legislators.
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and FinanceBusiness, Management and Accounting
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