Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory
The RAND Journal of EconomicsPublished 1 January 1996
David Martimort
Citations232
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score4.17
SNIP2.43
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Abstract
Egalement paru dans : INRA-ESR Toulouse Série D ; 92-08D et 94-11D
Keywords
Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Mathematical EconomicsOptimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
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