Language and practice

It is argued that language is, and must be, more central than physical practice in individual acquisition of practical understanding, and only this makes it possible for there to be a sociology of scientific knowledge, forthere to be scientific specialities, for thereto be a division of labour in society and for thereTo be a society that is more than a set of narrow and isolated worlds.

Abstract

What are the relative contributions of language and physical practice to practical understanding? The resolution of a series of puzzles depends upon the answer. I argue that language is, and must be, more central than physical practice in individual acquisition of practical understanding. Only this makes it possible for there to be a sociology of scientific knowledge, for there to be scientific specialities, for there to be a division of labour in society and for there to be a society that is more than a set of narrow and isolated worlds. Physical practice remains central to human culture but its influence is at the collective level at which languages are formed, rather than the individual level at which practical abilities are acquired. Domain languages 'contain' practices, and it is from these that individuals draw much, usually most, of their practical understanding. Because the individual level and the domain level have not previously been distinguished, certain philosophical problems have been wrongly cast and mistakes have been made. Domains of practice/language are embedded within one another in fractal-like relationships, and this is how we can make sense of higher levels of coordinated action. The ideas of 'special interactional expert', 'practice language' and 'methodological interactionalism' are introduced.