The group attribution error

Abstract

There is a parallel between our tendency to infer the attitudes of an individual on the basis of his or her behavior, regardless of the external constraints (Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977), and our tendency to infer the attitudes of a group on the basis of the group's decision, regardless of the group decision rule. The present research focuses on this latter process. What we term the group attribution error consists of the tendency to assume that group decisions reflect members' attitudes. This assumption can be erroneous because group decision rules, in addition to members' attitudes, can influence group decisions. In Experiment 1, members of a community in which a water conservation law was or was not instituted were assumed to have correspondent attitudes, regardless of how the community decision was made. In Experiments 2 and 3, subjects inferred a greater correspondence between out-group decisions and out-group attitudes than between an in-group decision and in-group attitudes. The fourth experiment found that subjects committed the group attribution error because they attended as much to the outcome of a recall election as to the actual proportion of voters for and against the recall. Finally, Experiment 5 showed that subjects' inferences of jury members' attitudes were influenced not only by the final jury vote but also by the actual decision, which was determined by the vote plus the decision rule by which the jury was bound. The results are related to previous research on the fundamental attribution error, stereotyping, and polarized appraisals of out-groups.