Moral Reasoning and Moral Behavior in Conventional Adults.

Abstract

Traditional approaches to the study of morality have found little relationship between either knowledge of or respect for conventional moral standards and moral behavior. Studies such as those of Havig hurst & Taba (1949), Hendry (1960), Lehrer (1967), Mills (1967), and Rau (1964) have supplied consistent support for the conclusions of a classic study on honesty by Hartshorne and May (1928-1930). Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) found that there is little relation ship between what people believe is right and wrong and what they do,· and that behaviors such as lying, cheating, and stealing are de termined mainly by situational demands, not characteristics of indi viduals. Although a factor analysis of Hartshorne and May's data by Burton (1963) revealed a general factor for cheating, the amount of variance accounted for by the factor was small. The cognitive-developmental theorist Kohlberg (1964, 1969, 1971) has challenged traditional conceptions of morality, and of fered a conceptually different approach to the understanding of the relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior. Kohlberg accepts the two main findings of traditional research: (a) there is not a necessary relationship between the content of moral reasoning (what people believe is right or wrong) and moral behavior; and (b) external situational demands determine behavior that is con ventionally considered moral. However, he holds that behavior that conforms to conventional standards of right and wrong is not neces sarily moral. According to Kohlberg, morality is an aspect of rea soning, not behavior. The only behaviors that can be considered moral are behaviors that spring from the types of moral decisions that are determined by high level moral reasoning. Behaviors such as lying, cheating, and stealing are generally immoral because they generally follow from low-level conceptions of morality. However, such behaviors are not necessarily immoral, or immoral by definition.