The Rational Choice Theory of Institutions: Implications for Design
Published 1 January 1995
Randall L. Calvert
Citations25
Generate an AI Snapshot to get a quick, structured summary of this paper.
Study Snapshot
ObjectiveStudy objective
MethodsResearch methodology
PopulationPopulation studied
Sample sizeSample sizes
OutcomesStudy outcomes here
ResultsStudy results comes here
LimitationsResearch study limitations comes here
A concise AI-generated summary of the paper will appear here once you click Generate AI Snapshot.
Abstract
Almost all accounts of policymaking organizations stress two important features. First, the process of policymaking, and the life of any organization, consists of a sequence of similar or related situations in which members of the organization must take actions. Second, the actions they take tend to fall into patterns: they behave in similar ways in similar situations, which is how we recognize a policy, an organization, or an institution in the first place
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
The Strategy of Conflict
7,131 Citations1960Thomas C. Schelling
The Journal of FinanceEconomics, Organization and Management.
4,778 Citations1993Sudipto Bhattacharya, Paul Milgrom +1 more
Journal of Economic TheoryRational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
2,529 Citations1982David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom +2 more
EconometricaThe Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
2,409 Citations1986Drew Fudenberg, Eric Maskin
Any individually rational payoff of a one-shot game can be approximated by sequential equilibrium payoffs of a long but finite game of incomplete information, where players' payoffs are almost certainly as in the one- shot game.
Management ScienceGames with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
2,181 Citations2004John C. Harsanyi
The paper develops a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some important parameters of the game situation, such as the payoff functions, the strategies available to various players, the information other players have about the game, etc.
Cambridge University Press eBooksCorporate culture and economic theory
2,124 Citations1990David M. Kreps
Management ScienceGames with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
2,110 Citations1967John C. Harsanyi
RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsA general theory of equilibrium selection in games
2,067 Citations1988John C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten
Economics and PoliticsTHE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS
1,804 Citations1990Paul Milgrom, Douglass C. North +1 more
Journal of Political EconomyCoordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
1,237 Citations1994Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom +1 more
Management ScienceGames with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
978 Citations1968John C. Harsanyi
Contemporary Sociology A Journal of ReviewsManagerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy.
717 Citations1993T. T. Voss, Gary J. Miller
Theory and decision library. Series C, Game theory, mathematical programming and operations researchThe chain store paradox
648 Citations1978Reinhard Selten
Political Science QuarterlyGoing by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness, <i>by Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan</i>
603 Citations1983Robert A. Katzmann
EconometricaLearning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
389 Citations1990Vincent P. Crawford, Hans Haller
American Political Science ReviewThe Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems
334 Citations1983Alphons J. C. van de Kragt, John Orbell +1 more
American Journal of Political ScienceThe Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information
270 Citations1992Jeffrey S. Banks, Barry R. Weingast
Virtual Defense Library (Ministerio de Defensa)Games and Decisions Introduction and Critical Survey
241 Citations1957LUCE, R. Duncan, RAIFFA, Howard.
RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsPolitical Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation
183 Citations1993William A. Barnett
Journal of Economics & Management StrategyI<scp>nformation</scp>, C<scp>ontrol</scp>, <scp>and</scp> O<scp>rganizational</scp> S<scp>tructure</scp>
162 Citations1992David P. Baron, David Besanko
International Political Science ReviewLeadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination
141 Citations1992Randall L. Calvert
The RAND Journal of EconomicsNoncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality
134 Citations1985David P. Baron
American Journal of Political ScienceAgency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing
119 Citations1989Jeffrey S. Banks
A model of legislature-agency interaction is analyzed where the agency possesses an informational advantage in that only it knows the cost of its services and the ability of the legislature to impose discipline on the agency's request and final budget through an optimal choice of audit and counterproposal strategies.
Journal of Public EconomicsRegulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information
69 Citations1985David P. Baron
Political Science QuarterlyRegulatory Bureaucracy: The Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Policy, <i>by Robert A. Katzmann</i>
59 Citations1980Ernest Gellhorn
Games and Economic BehaviorA battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
40 Citations1992Jeffrey S. Banks, Randall L. Calvert
The Caltech Institute Archives (California Institute of Technology)Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions
37 Citations1995Jeffrey S. Banks, Eric Allen Hanushek
