The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism
Philosophy of SciencePublished 1 December 1999
Elliott Sober
Citations326
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score0.69
SNIP0.82
Generate an AI Snapshot to get a quick, structured summary of this paper.
Study Snapshot
ObjectiveStudy objective
MethodsResearch methodology
PopulationPopulation studied
Sample sizeSample sizes
OutcomesStudy outcomes here
ResultsStudy results comes here
LimitationsResearch study limitations comes here
A concise AI-generated summary of the paper will appear here once you click Generate AI Snapshot.
Abstract
Reductionism is often understood to include two theses: (1) every singular occurrence that the special sciences can explain also can be explained by physics; (2) every law in a higher-level science can be explained by physics. These claims are widely supposed to have been refuted by the multiple realizability argument, formulated by Putnam (1967, 1975) and Fodor (1968, 1975). The present paper criticizes the argument and identifies a reductionistic thesis that follows from one of the argument's premises.
Keywords
Arts and HumanitiesPhysics and Astronomy
Essays on Actions and Events
4,706 Citations2001Donald Davidson
The Language of Thought
4,162 Citations1978Jerry A. Fodor
Princeton University Press eBooksScientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World
2,010 Citations2020Wesley C. Salmon
A Theory of Conditionals
1,756 Citations1968Robert Stalnaker
American Journal of PhysicsPatterns of Discovery
1,633 Citations1959Norwood Russell Hanson, Paul F. Schmidt
The Philosophical ReviewThe Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus.
1,096 Citations1986Robert N. Brandon, Elliott Sober
Minnesota studies in the philosophy of scienceUnity of Science as a Working Hypothesis
751 Citations1958Paul Oppenheim, Hilary Putnam
An artificial intelligence model designed to distinguish between healthy voices, laryngeal cancer voices, and those of the other laryngeal conditions is presented, highlighting the challenges of artificial intelligence-driven voice-based diagnosis due to overlaps with benign conditions but also underscore its potential.
Cambridge University Press eBooksThe Structure of Biological Science
726 Citations1985Alexander Rosenberg
The British Journal for the Philosophy of ScienceHow to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less<i>Ad Hoc</i>Theories will Provide More Accurate Predictions
655 Citations1994MALCOLM FORSTER, Elliott Sober
It is argued that this approach throws light on the theoretical virtues of parsimoniousness, unification, and non ad hocness, on the dispute about Bayesianism, and on empiricism and scientific realism.
The Philosophical ReviewBayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.
496 Citations1994David Christensen, John Earman
Psychological Explanation
449 Citations2007Craig Parsons
Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave
400 Citations1998John Bickle
Philosophy of ScienceThe Supervenience of Biological Concepts
149 Citations1978Alexander Rosenberg
The notion of supervenience is employed to provide a new statement of the relation of Mendelian predicates to molecular ones in order to provide for the commensurability and potential reducibility of MendELian to molecular genetics in a way that circumvents the theoretical complications which appear to stand in the way of such a reduction.
PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science AssociationWhy the Anti-reductionist Consensus Won’t Survive the Case of Classical Mendelian Genetics
131 Citations1990C. Kenneth Waters
This paper shows that the anti-reductionist consensus about genetics will not withstand serious scrutiny, and critical analysis uncovers tell-tale signs of a significant reduction in progress.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of ScienceBlack Box Inference: When Should Intervening Variables Be Postulated?
36 Citations1998Elliott Sober