Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals
Published 1 January 1976
William Harper
Citations99
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Abstract
This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.
Keywords
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