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Breaking and provably repairing the SSH authenticated encryption scheme

ACM Transactions on Information and System SecurityPublished 1 May 2004
Mihir Bellare, Tadayoshi Kohno, Chanathip Namprempre
Citations112

TL;DR

This paper proposes several fixes to the SSH protocol and, using techniques from modern cryptography, it proves that their modified versions of SSH meet strong new chosen-ciphertext privacy and integrity requirements.

Abstract

The secure shell (SSH) protocol is one of the most popular cryptographic protocols on the Internet. Unfortunately, the current SSH authenticated encryption mechanism is insecure. In this paper, we propose several fixes to the SSH protocol and, using techniques from modern cryptography, we prove that our modified versions of SSH meet strong new chosen-ciphertext privacy and integrity requirements. Furthermore, our proposed fixes will require relatively little modification to the SSH protocol and to SSH implementations. We believe that our new notions of privacy and integrity for encryption schemes with stateful decryption algorithms will be of independent interest.

Keywords

Computer Science