On the Anonymity of Banknotes

Lecture notes in computer sciencePublished 1 January 2005

Dennis Kügler

DOI10.1007/11423409_8

Source URL

Citations4

SJR quartileQ2

SJR score0.35

SNIP0.55

TL;DR

It is shown how to model intermediary-chains and present statistical methods that can be used by banks to extract information on the length of the chain from deposited banknotes to protect against deanonymizations.

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the anonymity of banknote based payments. We show how to model intermediary-chains and present statistical methods that can be used by banks to extract information on the length of the chain from deposited banknotes. If the bank has discovered a chain of length zero, the anonymity of the payment is immediately revoked. To protect against such deanonymizations, customers have to be very careful when spending banknotes.

Keywords

Computer Science

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