Interpersonal differences in social dilemmas: a game theoretical approach
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Abstract
It is easy to observe lack of cooperation in social dilemmas, that is in situations in which persons, by pursuing immediate self-interest, can harm their own group's interest. It is shown first that experimental games (i.e., Prisoner's-, Chicken- and Trust-Dilemma), are capable of capturing the essence of the decisional structure underlying real-world social dilemmas. Next, based upon a review of empirical research, social dilemmas in small groups are contrasted with social dilemmas in large groups. The main purpose of the present study is to examine the effect of factors which are assumed to influence cooperation-rates in social dilemmas involving a large number of persons.