When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect
American Economic ReviewPublished 1 August 2005
Gary Charness, Dan Levin
Citations264
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score25.10
SNIP6.91
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Abstract
When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect by Gary Charness and Dan Levin. Published in volume 95, issue 4, pages 1300-1309 of American Economic Review, September 2005
Keywords
Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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SSRN Electronic JournalWhen Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect
4 Citations2003Gary Charness, Dan Levin
The heart of the design examines how one’s propensity to use Bayes’ rule is affected by whether this rule is aligned with reinforcement or clashes with it, suggesting that the ‘emotional reinforcement’ induced by payments is a critical factor in deviations from Bayesian updating.