Exit from the group as an individualistic solution to the free rider problem in the United States and Japan

Abstract

Group members faced with the free riding problem may exit from the group as an individualistic solution to the problem. The prediction that group members, especially those whose contributions to the group task are high, would exit from the group more often as the cost for exit becomes smaller was successfully tested in an experiment using 40 three-person task groups. In addition, the effects of cultural collectivism on the exit response were predicted and tested by comparing American and Japanese subjects. It was argued that cultural collectivism among the Japanese is sustained by the system of mutual monitoring and sanctioning among group members so that free riding would be a more serious problem among the Japanese when mutual monitoring and sanctioning is removed. This leads to a prediction, which is opposite to the notion of strong group orientation of the Japanese, that Japanese subjects would exit from the group more often in the experimental group lacking opportunities for mutual monitoring and sanctioning. The results of the experiment supported this prediction.