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Grene on Mechanism and Reductionism: More Than Just a Side Issue

PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science AssociationPublished 1 January 1984
Robert N. Brandon
Citations43

TL;DR

In this paper the common association between ontological reductionism and a methodological position called 'Mechanism' is discussed and the nature and value of scientific explanations are discussed.

Abstract

Two summers ago Marjorie Grene described a mutual acquaintance as a young fogy. That immediately suggested a fourfold classification: Young fogies, old fogies, young turks and old turks. Marjorie's place in this classification is obvious; moreover, it is relevant to today's session. Were she just out of graduate school we would wait awhile to honor her. Here she a fogy we wouldn't bother. One of the ways Grene has expressed her anti-fogyism has been her consistent attacks on reductionism, especially reductionism in the philosophy of biology. In this paper I want to discuss the common association between ontological reductionism and a methodological position I will call mechanism . I wish to make three major points: (1) Mechanism (as I characterize it) is not to be identified with reductionism in any of its forms; in fact, mechanism leads to a nonreductionist ontology.

Keywords

Arts and HumanitiesBiochemistry, Genetics and Molecular BiologyPhysics and Astronomy