Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy

Abstract

In the latest issue of the UK-based Centre for the Study of Democracy, Keane asks 'Can an ideal backed up by little platoons of clashing metaphors and colliding justifications be anything other than essentially contestedeven downright incoherent?' (Keane, 2004(Keane, -2005, p. , p. 2).Democracy is a particularly ubiquitous concept at the moment and its relationship to political theory more generally is far from clear.The question of whether democracy is a desirable political ideal has tended to focus upon theorizations of what constitutes the democratic ideal, rather than how democratic ideals can be actualized in institutions.As well as this, the acceptance of democracy as a universal norm by some suggests that this is both achievable and desirable.As this review is being written, Iraqis are going to the polls for the first time in 50 years to elect a 275-seat transitional National Assembly.As world events unfold it becomes apparent that the nexus of democratic theory, practice and experience continues to be a rich source of lived reality to complement and question ongoing theorizations of democracy and democratization processes.One of the most striking aspects of any analysis of contemporary democratic theory and practice is the sheer range of different approaches to the subject matter.This is most certainly the case in reviewing these contemporary contributions to the ongoing discussions.Richardson's Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy, part of the Oxford Political Theory Series, takes four strands of the democratic ideal -liberalism, republicanism, rationalism, and populism -to create a conception of democracy as democratic autonomy, that he distinguishes from Held (1987) in two ways (p.255).He outlines a conception